US Sanctions Indian Network Running Iranian False Flag Registries

ARTICLE SUMMARY

US Treasury targets an Indian-run network providing fraudulent flagging and certification services to Iran's shadow fleet tankers.

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US Sanctions Indian Network Running Iranian False Flag Registries

The U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned an India-based network accused of orchestrating a sophisticated maritime fraud scheme to provide false flags and fraudulent certifications for Iran’s shadow fleet. The move targets the administrative infrastructure that allows sanctioned tankers to bypass international oversight and transport Iranian petroleum.

According to the Treasury, Suniel Kumar Sharma and Jaspreet Preeti Shahid operated a web of deceptive flagging authorities from Chandigarh, India. The network allegedly established fraudulent registries claiming to represent nations including Aruba, Guyana, Mali, and Mozambique. Most recently, the group operated the Eswatini Maritime Affairs and International Ship Registry from Singapore, despite public disavowals from the government of Eswatini and other affected nations.

Targeting the Administrative Layer

This enforcement action marks a strategic shift in the U.S. effort to dismantle the shadow fleet. While previous sanctions often focused on individual vessels or ship management companies, this designation targets the administrative service layer of maritime evasion. By creating counterfeit registries, the Sharma network provided the documentation necessary for vessels to secure port access and potentially deceive insurers and terminal operators who rely on flag-state legitimacy as a baseline for due diligence.

The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) accompanied the sanctions with a new alert to the maritime industry. The warning emphasizes that the burden of verification has moved beyond simply checking a vessel’s flag. Maritime stakeholders are now cautioned to screen for unscrupulous registries that impersonate sovereign nations, as these entities provide the veneer of legality required for sanctioned Iranian and Russian trade.

Operational and Regulatory Risks

The Sharma network’s activities date back as early as 2014, beginning with an attempt to impersonate the flagging authority of Dominica. The U.S. reports that the network utilizes purchased web domains and professional-looking websites to offer seafarer training, certification, and vessel classification services. These services, which are traditionally the purview of legitimate organizations holding vessels to international safety standards, were instead used to facilitate the movement of Iranian oil.

The designation of Aryavart Ship Management Private Limited and the Eswatini Maritime Affairs and International Ship Registry effectively isolates these entities from the global financial system. For legitimate operators, the development underscores a growing regulatory risk: the emergence of registry-as-a-service fraud. This trend complicates the compliance landscape for charterers and port authorities, who must now account for the possibility that a vessel’s entire administrative identity may be a fabrication.

In a related move, OFAC also sanctioned Turkish-based Fugo Ground Services for its support of Iran’s aviation sector. The Treasury reiterated that it will continue to map and dismantle the financial channels and facilitators Iran uses to fund its regional activities through the Operation Economic Outcast initiative, working alongside the European Union, United Kingdom, and Gulf state partners.

Source: The Maritime Executive