Maritime Coastal Border Security And The Role Of USCG
By Bert Macesker & Dr. Joe DiRenzo
February 3, 2025
The United States’ maritime coastal security poses a significant challenge due to the vastness of its coastline and the complexity of its maritime borders. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Geodetic Survey there are approximately 95,000 miles of coastline. According to the Department of Homeland Security 2007 Transportation Systems publication there are “361 ports, and 3.3 million square miles of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to secure”. The country’s maritime borders present a formidable task for security agencies.
Now for a comparison – The combined land borders between the United States and Canada, according to the joint International Boundary Commission is 2,380 miles. In addition, the joint US-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission state that the Mexico-United States border extends 1,954 miles. The combined US-Mexico and US-Canada borders of 4,334 miles represent only 4.5% of the combined U.S. land and maritime border and coastline that can potentially be exploited.
Historical Context and Evolution of Maritime Coastal Security
In 1816, Congress appropriated an initial $800,000 ($19 million in today’s dollars) to build a fortification system, referred to as the Third System, to protect the country’s coastline. President James Monroe’s Second Inaugural Address in 1821 highlighted the significance of maritime coastal security, stating that “by these fortifications, supported by our navy, to which they would afford like support, we should present to other powers an armed front from the St. Croix to the Sabine, which would protect, in the event of war, our whole coast and interior from invasion.” The construction of the 42 major forts along the East and West Coasts was a testament to the government’s commitment to maritime coastal security. Many on these forts are now National Parks. The USCG Research and Development Center (RDC) is co-located at one of these in New London, CT, called Fort Trumbull. RDC moved into the remaining building from when the Navy Underwater Sound Laboratory, also co-located, had long closed.
While the forts are no longer active in conducting the coastal security mission, it does not mean that maritime coastal security is less important today. In fact, in the last five years, a smuggling situation has become so prevalent in the maritime environment that the U.S State Department issued an “Advisory to the Shipping Industry on the Illicit Movement Methods Related to the Trafficking of Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids” that noted:
The opioid crisis is a serious epidemic that requires a multidisciplinary approach including aggressive investigation and prosecution, in addition to collaboration with private sector partners in the fields of technology, health care, prevention, treatment, and education. The Federal government, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners and the private sector must work together to leverage our resources in the fight against this deadly threat. The private sector can play a key role combating the opioid crisis by working with law enforcement to identify the ways in which criminals are exploiting legal platforms for illicit means and referring criminal activity to law enforcement.
But, with this threat and many others in the modern era, there is a formal organization that serves as the de facto coastal “fortifications” – these are the 37 Coast Guard Sectors, which include small boat stations, small boats, assorted air components, networked command and control, and dedicated Department of Homeland Security professionals.
The Mission of Maritime Coastal Security
The mission of maritime coastal security is critical to the country’s security, economic interests, and protecting its environmental resources. Maritime coastal security involves the protection of our Nation’s coasts from a myriad of threats. These threats range from drug, human, and weapon smuggling, attacks on port facilities, illegal fishing, and criminal activity. The Coast Guard plays a vital role in securing maritime borders, and its efforts are focused on detecting and preventing various threats, including human smuggling, illegal fishing, and the transportation of illicit drugs. Despite the significant challenges, the Coast Guard made notable progress in removing cocaine from the maritime environment, with over 96 metric tons removed in Fiscal Year 2023.
The service is equally committed to stopping the growing threat posed by fentanyl and precursor chemicals shipped from China. Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WISCONSIN), who is the Chair of the Commerce Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries, Climate Change and Manufacturing, held a subcommittee hearing on the Coast Guard’s efforts to stop the flow of dangerous drugs. In her opening remarks the senator noted, “In recent years, the Coast Guard has demonstrated the ability to play a role in the tracking and removal of fentanyl and its precursor chemicals while they are being shipped from China, including contributing to the inspection of 460 metric tons of precursor chemicals transiting the Pacific in Fiscal Year 2023.”
Senator Baldwin continued: “In recent years, fentanyl has killed thousands of Wisconsinites, devastating families and communities in every corner of the state. I’ve heard from mothers who lost children, cops and paramedics on the front lines, and advocates – all demanding we do more to end this crisis.” She added: “This crisis demands a whole of government effort and I’m pushing to ensure all law enforcement and armed forces are working in lockstep to protect our communities. The Coast Guard plays a critical role in disrupting the global fentanyl supply chain, and I called this hearing today to see how we can bolster their efforts, including stopping the flow of precursor chemicals from China.”
Maritime coastal security is much more than stopping drug flow. Protecting the Marine Transportation System (MTS) includes security patrols as part of the Coast Guard’s Ports, Waterways, & Coastal Security (PWCS) mission and safeguarding the cybersecurity of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. Non-state and state actors that wish to harm the U.S. recognize the vastness of U.S. coastlines and potential for exploitation. Smuggling with large and small hard-to-detect self-propelled semi-submersibles is a real threat and launching of air, surface, or underwater drone swarms from a state-sponsored mothership off the coast may seem unlikely today but is possible.
The Role of Research and Development in Maritime Coastal Security
Research and development (R&D) is a means to effective maritime coastal security. Maritime coastal security benefits from R&D through its application of the scientific method to acquire knowledge to create/adapt new technology along with the necessary disciplines to solve security challenges through applied research. R&D in maritime coastal security is important to the development of advanced surveillance and monitoring systems. These systems enable authorities to detect and track suspicious vessels, monitor maritime traffic, and respond quickly to security threats. R&D in sensors, radar, and satellite technologies has improved the accuracy and range of surveillance systems, allowing for more effective monitoring of coastal areas. One of the key principles that guide operational priorities and investments from the Coast Guard Operational Posture 2024 calls for “evolving an operational approach leveraging intelligence, information, and improved maritime domain awareness to shift from patrol and interdict to target and interdict.” The coupled use of artificial intelligence and large language models to support intelligence and the lowered bar to attaining space-based sensing capabilities will help facilitate this operational priority.
R&D also plays a critical role in developing effective countermeasures against maritime security threats, such as piracy, terrorism, and smuggling. For example, research into materials science and engineering has led to the development of advanced coatings and materials that can withstand explosive blasts and reduce the risk of damage to vessels.
Furthermore, R&D in maritime coastal security is essential for developing sustainable and environmentally friendly solutions. The maritime domain is vulnerable to environmental pollution, and R&D in green technologies, such as wind and solar power, can help reduce the carbon footprint of maritime operations and provide resilience for attacks on maritime infrastructure.
In addition, R&D in maritime coastal security is critical for developing effective response strategies and protocols. Research into emergency response planning, search and rescue operations, and crisis management has improved the ability of authorities to respond quickly and effectively to maritime security incidents.
Overall, R&D is essential for enhancing maritime coastal security. By developing innovative technologies, strategies, and policies, R&D can help address the complex challenges facing the maritime domain, protect national interests, and ensure the safety of people and goods.
The Coast Guard RDC
The Coast Guard Commandant is provided a specific appropriation to conduct R&D under Title 14 U.S.C. 504(a). The RDC plays a role in advancing technologies, using the $6.7 million appropriation provided by Congress to support the 11 missions of the Coast Guard that include research to secure maritime borders. The RDC recently reorganized its research portfolio under enduring research program areas, including Autonomy, Connectivity, Defense & Safety Systems, Environmental Evolution & Waterway Resilience, Data, Modeling & Decision Support, and Integration, Experimentation, and Transition. These research areas are designed to facilitate collaboration with a wide range of partners, including other armed services, the Department of Energy National Labs, the Federal Lab Consortium, and private industry.
Each enduring research program will have multiple lines of effort (LOEs). For example, the Autonomy research area focuses on the strategic application of automation and autonomous technologies to advance the capabilities of physical, virtual, and other systems. It includes how autonomy may be used by other maritime stakeholders and/or adversaries, how that use will impact the service, and how the service will need to adapt to maintain a competitive edge. LOEs include optionally crewed surface vessels, beyond visual line of sight for uncrewed aircraft systems, and integration into search and rescue (SAR) operations. Each research program area can also be tied back to strategy(s). For example, the Coast Guard promulgated the Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan in 2023.
The Defense & Safety Systems research area focuses on the safety of Coast Guard members, MTS, and the public. Defensive systems including non-lethal vessel stopping technologies, counter unmanned systems (C-UxS), cybersecurity and redundancy in Operational Technology and navigation systems to protect assets from evolving threats.
The Connectivity research area focuses on Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, and Intelligence and extends to include Information Technology and networking, mobile device solutions, data connectivity from all sensors and platforms (manned or unmanned), at any latitude and longitude. Projects include the next generation of Automatic Identification System and Alternate Navigation Positioning Sources.
The Environmental Evolution & Waterway Resilience area focuses on the changing environment and how the Coast Guard and the public interact with our evolving waterways. This includes evolving missions due to sea level rise, extreme weather events, offshore energy generation and transport, and threats due to a changing maritime domain.
The Data, Modeling & Decision Support area focuses on enhancing Coast Guard effectiveness using data, with research supporting incorporation and development of advanced methodologies, use of emerging data technologies, and complex analytics. Current research includes Space-based Radio Frequency Detection and Risk-based Container Inspection Targeting.
The Integration, Experimentation, and Transition area supports the execution of all lines of effort within the five research areas described above. The RDC already has a long history of provisioning cutter crews with prototype equipment and go-kits. These ready go-kits have included, for example, space accountability and contraband marker technologies. Investing in repurposing commercial and government off-the-shelf technologies has always been a part of the RDC portfolio and will be continued in the new Integration, Experimentation, and Transition area. Current low-cost technology being investigated include: the evaluation of glow-in-the-dark maritime equipment to assist with passing tow lines to other boats, man overboard drills, and night anchoring; the use of Amber Alert–like systems to augment PAN-PANs by sending text alerts to a geofenced area with information about local maritime emergencies; testing of body worn camera technology to assess their physical integration in law enforcement operations; and evaluation of various off the shelf sensors for low cost ISR buoys powered by wind, solar, and wave energy.
Challenges and Future Directions
A focus of the incoming administration will be on border security. This will involve securing the southern border of the U.S. with the completion of the physical wall that will be monitored and supported by personnel to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism. Achieving complete operational border control will be difficult. Smugglers and adversaries are driven by profit and/or desire to harm the U.S. They are smart, innovative, well-funded, and will systematically probe border weaknesses to find less risky transit routes. More control of the land border will have the effect of increasing the attractiveness of waterborne smuggling routes.
The coastal fortifications of the past are part of our history. Today, we already have a Fourth System of coastal defense along the coastlines and 360 U.S. ports. They are the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other agencies along with the many cooperating capabilities that include the National Targeting Center, National Vessel Movement Center, Coast Guard Sectors, and CBP Air and Marine Operations. They are the virtual seawall that protects our coasts at the same time facilitating commerce and the safe enjoyment of our coastal waters by its citizens. A barrier, whether physical or virtual, is only as good as the authorities that favor deterrence, intelligence, and the technological and non-technological capabilities to detect, track, and apprehend. And unlike a physical fence, a virtual maritime seawall can be easily updated, modified, or expanded to respond to changing security threats and requirements. Additionally, it can cover a much larger area, including the entire Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and provide real-time situational awareness and response capabilities.
Conclusion
The authors introduced the notion of a Fourth System and concept of a Virtual Maritime Seawall analogy to land border security to inspire more thought, but also to recognize our existing coastal security system and its continued importance to securing the homeland.
As the R&D arm for DHS’s largest maritime component, the RDC has completed countless projects aimed at improving Coast Guard operations at sea. Continuing some of the original tenants of defensive coastal fortifications of the past into today’s even more complex challenges will require a whole of government approach to monitor and enforce U.S. maritime borders, coastlines, and ports of entry.
About the authors:
Bert Macesker is the Executive Director of the USCG Research and Development Center.
Dr. Joe DiRenzo is the Center’s Partnership Director. He is a retired USCG Officer who teaches part-time for American Military University and National University.